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Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of mutual funds in enhancing financial reporting quality in China. 
Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors. Therefore, they are 
expected to be more effective at preventing executives from expropriating investors and manipulating 
earnings as a cover-up, which in turn would reduce the incidence of modified audit opinions (MAOs). 
Our results, based on the Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2008, confirm this prediction. More 
importantly, the effects of mutual fund ownership in reducing the incidence of MAOs are greater 
among privately owned enterprises (POEs), and especially those with higher growth. This is because 
POEs rely more heavily on the capital market for financing than do state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
and because growth opportunities need to be funded by additional external capital. This finding 
implies that mutual funds form an important part of the external governance mechanism in emerging 
countries, but this effect is moderated by state control and ownership.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
We study the effect of institutional investors on financial reporting quality in an emerging 
country by examining the relationship between mutual fund ownership and the issuance of modified 
auditor opinion (MAO) among Chinese firms. There has been a steady rise in the mutual fund 
industry across the world since the 1990s. Over the period from 1992 to 1998, for instance, the total 
assets of US mutual funds grew from 1.6 to 5.5 trillion USD (Klapper et al., 2004). In China, the 
mutual fund industry has also experienced high growth since it began in the early 2000s. Over the 
period from 2005 to 2007, for example, the total net value of Chinese mutual funds increased from 
58.6 to 236.3 billion USD (Yuan et al., 2008). The two main benefits mutual funds offer individual 
investors are the diversification of investment risks and the expertise to monitor the firms they invest 
in. The latter function essentially qualifies institutional investors such as mutual funds to serve as an 
external governance mechanism. The governance role of institutional ownership has been widely 
examined and confirmed in Western developed economies (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Smith, 
1996). However, little is known about either its role in enhancing financial reporting quality, and its 
contribution in emerging countries such as China, where investor protection and legal enforcement 
are weak, is under-researched. Our study fills these gaps. 
 
Auditing, which serves as an external monitoring mechanism to constrain manager’s 
opportunistic behavior that results from the separation of ownership and control, can reduce 
information asymmetry between managers and external investors (Kinney and Martin, 1994). 
Auditors communicate with users of financial statements through their opinion expressed in the 
auditor’s report; a clean opinion indicates that the financial reports are prepared in accordance with 
accounting standards and do not contain fundamental uncertainties that will need to be clarified later. 
When firms carry out earnings management, the likelihood of receiving a MAO is higher (e.g. Datar 
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et al., 1991; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; Chen et al., 2013). Auditors issue MAOs in order to raise 
the alarm regarding any questionable accounting disclosures they detect (e.g. DeAngelo, 1991; 
Krishnan et al., 1996). In this study, we assume the issuance of a MAO by the auditor of a firm to be 
an ex post manifestation of low financial reporting quality.2  
 
The rationale for the influence of mutual fund ownership on the likelihood of firms receiving 
MAOs is as follows. As large shareholders, mutual funds are more capable of persuading managers 
against decisions that could reduce firm value or expropriate investor wealth, and disciplining them 
when they do take such decisions (e.g. Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Hartzell and Starks, 2003). Better 
monitoring and governance reduces the opportunity for managers to pursue self-serving behavior. 
This in turn reduces the need for them to manipulate earnings to window dress their performance and 
conceal their misconduct (e.g. Klein, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2012). Therefore, to the extent that 
institutional investors act as an external governance mechanism and reduce the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, we expect an inverse relationship between mutual fund 
ownership and the likelihood of a firm receiving a MAO. 
 
In the context of China, one possible hindrance to external governance mechanisms through 
institutional investors such as mutual funds is the state ownership and control of firms in China. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are expected to carry out the social or political objectives of the 
government, and focus less on shareholder wealth maximization objectives. In return, such firms 
receive greater financial assistance from the state through favorable loans from state banks as well as 
subsidies (e.g. Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2010). This financial assistance renders SOEs less 
dependent on the capital market for financing, which in turn reduces their accountability to investors. 
                                                 
2 MAOs are interpreted as a signal of low financial reporting quality from the viewpoint of financial statement users such 
as the investors. For example, using data on Chinese listed firms, Chen et al. (2000) show negative abnormal stock returns 
over a three-day window centered on the announcement of a MAO, which suggests that firms receiving MAOs experience  
increased costs of capital. 
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Meanwhile, privately owned enterprises (POEs), which in China tend to be entrepreneurial firms, are 
more reliant on the capital market for funding. As a result, such firms are expected to be more 
responsive to the demands of outside investors. Existing empirical evidence suggests that managerial 
remuneration is more sensitive to stock return performance (Firth et al., 2006; Hou et al., 2013), and 
the cost of equity is more sensitive to audit quality (Chen et al., 2011), among privately controlled 
listed firms than their state-controlled counterparts in China. Therefore, state ownership is expected 
to moderate the governance effect of institutional investors. In other words, we expect the inverse 
relationship between mutual fund ownership and MAO to be more pronounced among POEs. 
 
To test our assertions, we empirically analyze a sample of Chinese listed firms, with 8,231 
firm-year observations over the period from 2003 to 2008. We obtain data on MAOs issued to 
Chinese listed firms from the China Securities Market & Accounting Research (GTA/CSMAR) 
database. To measure the influence of fund ownership, we apply both open- and closed-end funds. In 
both cases, we observe consistently and significantly negative relationships between MAO issuance 
and mutual fund ownership. This is in line with greater financial reporting quality among firms for 
which institutional investors are more influential as an external governance mechanism. Furthermore, 
we observe that this effect is more pronounced among POEs than SOEs, and especially among those 
with higher growth opportunities. This is consistent with institutional investors having more 
influence over the transparency of firms that are more dependent on the capital market for funding. 
Our findings are robust to the control of firm characteristics, governance, industry and regional 
effects, as well as the potential endogeneity between fund ownership and financial reporting quality. 
 
Our study contributes to the corporate governance literature in two ways. First, institutional 
investors can help promote financial reporting quality in transitional economies such as China. In an 
institutional environment with weaker legal enforcement and shareholder protection, the external 
governance role played by institutional ownership is especially important. Second, state control of 
5 
 
listed firms moderates the benefits of external governance mechanisms such as that provided by 
institutional investors.  Therefore, despite some studies suggesting that Chinese SOEs are adapting 
well to the new market-based economy (e.g. Lin and Germain, 2003; Ralston et al., 2006), our 
findings suggest that state ownership impedes the benefits provided by institutional investors. Our 
study has two policy implications. First, institutional investors such as mutual funds should be further 
encouraged to improve corporate governance and transparency in emerging economies. The expertise 
and experience of foreign institutional investors may be especially useful. Second, a further reduction 
of the state influence over listed firms in China could be considered so as to strengthen the capital 
market’s function in disciplining firms and allocating financial resources effectively. 
 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains our methodologies and sample. Section 4 presents and analyzes our 
empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
 
2.1 Effect of large shareholders on corporate governance  
 
Due to the separation of ownership and control, managers have the opportunity and the 
incentive to expropriate wealth at the expense of the shareholders. On the one hand, dispersed 
ownership exacerbates agency problems because shareholders are not effective or influential enough 
to dissuade managers from engaging in self-serving behaviors (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On 
the other hand, concentrated ownership induces two opposing effects on corporate governance, 
namely the entrenchment effect and the incentive alignment effect. 
 
The entrenchment effect of large shareholders is conceptually similar to that of managers with a 
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high degree of ownership. Existing literature suggests that such managers have a greater incentive to 
pursue their own interests because shareholders have relatively lower power to influence and monitor 
them (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). In the same way, large 
shareholders who gain effective control of a firm’s management also have greater incentives to 
pursue their own interests at the expense of minority investors (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Empirical studies document that firms’ market values decline when the control rights of large 
shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights (Claessens et al., 2002), and that controlling shareholders 
engage in “tunneling” to transfer both assets and profits out of the firm for their own benefit (Johnson 
et al., 2000). 
 
The incentive alignment effect of large shareholders arises when they share with minority 
shareholders the objective to maximize the market value of the firm. Existing literature (e.g. Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Maug, 1998, Noe, 2002) suggests that large shareholders have more resources and 
expertise than individual investors when it comes to monitoring managers. Gomes (2000) also 
suggests that ownership concentration signals reputation-building by the controlling shareholders. In 
this context, large shareholders would lose more from their firm’s decline in market value than they 
could gain by diverting their firm’s cash flow to themselves. Empirical studies document that 
institutional ownership is positively related to various measures of firm performance (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999), that managerial remuneration tends to be tighter 
among firms with larger shareholders (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Hartzell and Starks, 2003), 
and that such firms are associated with greater managerial accountability (Kaplan and Minton, 1994; 
Kang and Shivdasani, 1995).  
 
Existing empirical studies suggest that large shareholders such as mutual funds tend to be 
associated with the incentive alignment effect (e.g. Admati et al., 1994). For instance, the studies of 
Cornett et al. (2007), Yuan et al. (2008) and Ding et al. (2013) document the positive effects of mutual 
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fund ownership on firm performance and stock informativeness, while Morgan et al. (2009) observe 
that mutual funds vote more affirmatively for wealth-increasing proposals. On the other hand, 
empirical studies show that large shareholders that represent the state tend to exert an entrenchment 
effect. For instance, Chinese SOEs are observed to have lower share price informativeness (Gul et al., 
2010), CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity (Conyon and He, 2008), CEO pay-to-performance 
sensitivity (Firth et al., 2006; 2007), and performance (Chen et al., 2008). Thus, mutual fund 
ownership and state ownership in China are expected to have opposing effects on corporate 
governance. 
 
2.2 The effect of corporate governance and information transparency 
 
The relationship between the corporate governance and information transparency of firms is 
well established in the literature based on Western capital markets. Dechow et al. (1996) show that 
earnings management is more likely among firms with fewer outside block holders or with boards of 
directors dominated by the management. Klein (2002) finds lower abnormal accruals among firms 
with board or audit committee independence. Ajinkya et al. (2005) observe more accurate 
management earnings forecasts among firms with greater board independence or institutional 
ownership. Kelton and Yang (2008) show a positive relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and financial reporting quality as measured through disclosure on the Internet. 
Armstrong et al. (2012) document that the enactment of state anti-takeover laws in the US invoked a 
reduction in information asymmetry and an improvement in financial statement informativeness.  
 
Similar supportive findings of a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm 
transparency are documented even in transitional economies such as China. Ding et al. (2007) show 
that state-controlled firms, which have weaker protection for minority shareholders than privately 
controlled firms, are associated with a higher level of earnings management. Firth et al. (2007) show 
8 
 
greater earnings informativeness among firms with a higher proportion of foreign shareholders and 
tradable shares. Wang et al. (2008) indicate that firms in less developed regions, which have weaker 
investor protection and legal enforcement, are more likely to select smaller auditors. Hou et al. (2012) 
demonstrate that, since the Split Share Structure Reform, which has improved the corporate 
governance incentives of state shareholders, there has been an increase in share price informativeness 
among state-controlled listed firms.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
 
The literature review presented above highlights two core issues related to our study. First, the 
external monitoring effect provided by institutional investors such as mutual funds is expected to 
improve corporate governance. Second, firms with better corporate governance are expected to be 
associated with greater transparency and less information asymmetry. We merge these issues to 
examine whether the propensity of Chinese listed firms to receive MAOs is reduced by mutual fund 
ownership, and whether this effect is moderated by state ownership. 
 
The inverse relationship between mutual fund ownership and MAO is expected for the 
following reasons. First, investors attach a higher discount rate to firms associated with greater 
information asymmetry. This directly decreases the market value of securities issued by less 
transparent firms, which in turn deteriorates the performance of mutual funds that invest in such 
securities. Poor disclosure by firms may also have an indirect negative impact on the reputation of the 
stock selection skills of fund managers who invest in them. Due to these vested interests, mutual 
funds are expected to have an incentive to actively monitor firms and put pressure on them not to 
engage in opportunistic behaviors, including earnings manipulation that could reduce the wealth of 
the shareholders. Second, mutual fund managers are considered to be more sophisticated and to have 
more expertise than individual investors. They hire their own buy-side analysts to assess firms, which 
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reduces the possibility of collusion between sell-side analysts and firms. As a result, they are more 
capable of detecting earnings manipulation instigated by managers seeking to cover up 
misdemeanors and expropriation. Third, as large shareholders, mutual funds have greater voting 
power, more influence over the board, and a greater impact on share price movements than dispersed 
individual investors. This makes them more able to discipline firms and deter them from engaging in 
the managerial opportunism that can cause poor disclosure and information transparency. With 
greater incentives, expertise, and power, mutual funds are more likely to exert a positive influence on 
financial reporting quality, helping to avoid whistle blowing by auditors through MAOs. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Mutual fund ownership helps to reduce the incidence of modified audit opinion. 
 
Firms that are more dependent on the capital markets for funding are likely to be more 
concerned about the opinions of external investors. In the context of China, the reliance on capital 
market funding varies between SOEs and POEs. SOEs tend to receive more government financial 
assistance, and are expected to pursue social and political objectives which do not necessarily 
maximize shareholder wealth. On the contrary, POEs, which are often entrepreneurial firms, depend 
more on capital market for financing, and are therefore more responsive to the demands of external 
investors. Thus, the influence of mutual funds in promoting financial reporting quality is expected to 
be greater among POEs since they are more sensitive to investors’ opinions. A reduction in the market 
value of securities due to information asymmetry will have a greater impact on POEs since they are 
more dependent on the capital markets. As such, the power of institutional investors to influence 
managerial decisions and monitor for managerial opportunism is also expected to be greater among 
POEs. If it is indeed the demand for external capital that renders the financial reporting quality of 
POEs more sensitive to institutional investor ownership, then we would also expect this effect to be 
more pronounced among those with higher growth. This is because POEs with higher growth are 
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likely to have a greater demand for capital to finance their investment opportunities than their 
lower-growth counterparts. In other words, we expect the disciplining effect of external governance 
on financial reporting quality to be greater among high-growth entrepreneurial firms. Given these 
arguments, we hypothesize that:  
 
H2: The negative effect of mutual fund ownership on the incidence of modified audit opinion is 
more pronounced among Chinese POEs than SOEs.  
 
H3: Evidence consistent with hypothesis H2 is more pronounced among POEs with higher 
growth opportunities. 
 
3. Research design 
 
To test our hypothesis H1, which predicts a negative relationship between MAO and mutual 
fund ownership, we apply the following probit model: 
 
tt
tttt
IndustryRegioncontrolsGovernance
controlsFirmPOEFundMAO






1
112110
_
_
    (1)
 
 
where the modified audit opinion variable (MAO) represents an ex post manifestation of financial 
reporting quality and is a dummy indicator equal to one if the auditor issues a MAO to firm i in year t, 
and zero otherwise. We follow prior literature (e.g., Firth et al., 2011) and classify audit opinions that 
are qualified, disclaimer or adverse opinion as MAOs. The one-year-lagged independent variable 
Fund represents the degree of mutual fund ownership. We use the following three measures of fund 
ownership: the ratio of open fund ownership to freely-traded shares (OFOF); the ratio of closed-end 
fund ownership to freely-traded shares (CFOF); and the ratio of total fund ownership to freely-traded 
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shares (TFOF). POE is a binary variable that equals one for firms that are not controlled by the state, 
and zero otherwise. The marginal effect of α1 in Equation (1) indicates the relationship between the 
likelihood of receiving MAOs and mutual fund ownership, and to support our hypothesis H1, we 
expect it to be negative, showing the effect of mutual funds’ influence in the previous year on the 
incidence of MAO in the current year.  
 
We incorporate the following one-year-lagged control variables of firm characteristics 
(Firm_controls): Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. PB is the price-to-book ratio, 
which proxies for growth. ST equals one if a listed firm experienced losses in the previous two 
consecutive years, and zero otherwise. Chinese listed firms are delisted if they report losses for three 
consecutive years. Foreign is the ratio of foreign shares, that is, owned by foreign investors, to total 
shares. Analyst is the number of financial analysts following the firm. OwnCon, which measures the 
ownership concentration, is the Herfindahl index of the top 10 block holders. Big4 is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors (i.e., Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte), and zero otherwise.3  
 
We also control for one-year-lagged corporate governance variables (Governance_controls) in 
our analyses. Previous studies suggest that boards with a high percentage of independent directors 
and more frequent meetings can more effectively safeguard the interests of the shareholders (e.g., 
Beasley, 1996; Adams, 2003). We consider the effect of the following board features. Duality is a 
dummy indicator, which takes the value of one if the CEO of the firm also holds the position of 
chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. Meet represents the meeting frequency of the board. BSize 
is the number of board members. Indep is the percentage of independent directors. SBsize is the 
                                                 
3 In China, Big 4 auditing firms are legally required to launch a joint venture with a local firm in order to provide it with 
auditing services. We classify an auditing service as provided by one of the Big 4 if one of the firm’s partners is a Big 4 
auditing firm. 
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number of supervisory board members.  
 
We also control for region and industry fixed effects in our analyses. The industry fixed effect 
addresses the possible influence of cross-sectional variations in sector-specific factors on our 
analysis. We define industry according to the first two digits of the Global Industry Classification 
Standards (GICS). We include the region fixed effect to address the potential influence of 
differentiated levels of market and institutional development across China.4 Following Firth et al. 
(2006), we classify firms into four different regions based on their level of economic and institutional 
development. We summarize the variable definitions in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
To test hypothesis H2, which predicts that the inverse relationship between MAO and mutual 
fund ownership will be more pronounced among POEs, we apply the following probit model with an 
interaction term between POE and Fund: 
 






IndustryRegioncontrolsGovernance
controlsFirmPOEFundPOEFundMAO
t
tttttt
1
111312110
_
_
         (2)
 
 
where the marginal effect of Fund (β1) indicates the impact of mutual fund ownership on the 
incidence of MAO in SOEs, while the marginal effect of the interaction between Fund and POE (β3) 
indicates the incremental effect in POEs compared to firms in general. To support hypothesis H2, we 
expect to document a significantly negative β3 suggesting that the effect of mutual fund ownership is 
more pronounced in POEs than SOEs. 
                                                 
4 For example, the market development in the east is more advanced than in the central and western provinces (Fan and 
Wang, 2004). It is recognized that institutional and market development has a significant impact on financial reporting 
quality (Firth et al., 2012; 2011).  
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To test hypothesis H3, we partition the sample into high and low-growth sub-samples based on 
the median level of the price-to-book ratio and replicate the test using Equation (2). Since firms with 
higher growth have more demand for investment capital, they should be more sensitive to the 
disciplining and monitoring effect of institutional investors. To support hypothesis H3, we expect to 
document a significantly negative marginal effect of the interaction between Fund and POE (β3) in 
the high-growth sub-sample, but an insignificant marginal effect in the low-growth sub-sample.  
 
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
The dummy variable POE is collected from the database of the China Centre for Economic 
Research (CCER/Sinofin), and the rest of the data used in this study are collected from the 
CSMAR/GTA database. Our sample consists of 8,231 firm-year observations, among which 773 
MAOs are identified over the period from 2003 to 2008. 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses, and compares the 
sub-samples of firm-year observations with and without MAO issuance. The former group accounts 
for 9.38% of our full sample. For both sub-samples, we find that the ownership level by open-end 
funds is greater than that by closed-end funds. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2000), 
firms that receive MAOs have smaller market capitalization, and are likely to be associated with 
Special Treatment status. Firms that receive MAOs also tend to be POEs, tend to be followed by 
fewer analysts, and tend not to use Big 4 auditing firms. In terms of corporate governance features, we 
find that firms that receive MAOs are more likely to have the same person as CEO and chairman, a 
smaller ratio of independent directors, and less frequent board meetings. These findings are consistent 
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with the view that internal governance factors such as board activity and board independence 
contribute to high financial reporting quality. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
       
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation analysis for the main variables. In favor of our 
hypothesis H1, MAO is negatively correlated with all measures of mutual fund ownership, suggesting 
that external monitoring by institutional investors reduce the incidence of MAO. Consistent with 
Wang et al. (2008), we find MAO to be positively correlated with POE. Other variables such as Size, 
Analyst, OwnCon, and Big4 are negatively correlated with MAO, which suggests that firms that are 
larger, have less concentrated ownership, are followed by more analysts, and are audited by Big 4 
auditors are less likely to receive MAOs. The MAO measure is also negatively correlated with Meet 
and Indep, which indicates that active boards and independent boards may effectively constrain 
managerial opportunism, leading to a lower possibility of receiving a MAO. The correlation between 
MAO and ST is positive, implying that firms experiencing consecutive losses have greater incentives 
to manipulate earnings to avoid being delisted. All measures of fund ownership are negatively 
correlated with POE and ST, while being positively correlated with Size, PB, and Analyst. This 
suggests that mutual funds have higher ownership of firms that are larger, higher growth, and 
followed by more analysts, but are less likely to invest in POEs and firms that experience consecutive 
losses. In addition, we find that POEs are generally smaller firms with high growth potential.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2 Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
Table 4 presents our results for the test of H1 based on the marginal effects of the probit 
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regression analyses specified in Equation (1), and three different measures of fund ownership. The 
marginal effects at the means (i.e. dy/dx) are reported. The marginal effect of Fund is significantly 
negative across all regressions, indicating that fund ownership in the previous year contributes to 
better financial reporting quality in the current year, which supports our hypothesis H1. The results 
are robust after controlling for firm-specific and governance variables, and both region and industry 
fixed effects. Turning to the control variables, the marginal effect of POE is positive and significant in 
all regressions, which implies that POEs are more likely to receive MAOs and is consistent with the 
findings documented in Wang et al. (2008). As state-controlled firms are economically protected by 
the central or local government, auditors are less likely to issue MAOs for these firms. We find that 
larger firms and those followed by more analysts are less likely to receive MAOs, while firms 
experiencing consecutive losses are more likely to receive them. The marginal effect of Big4 is 
insignificant, which suggests that higher-quality auditors do not necessarily issue more MAOs. In 
China, firms with higher financial reporting quality are more likely to select Big 4 auditors, and firms 
with lower financial reporting quality are more likely to appoint less independent auditors, who in 
turn are less likely to issue MAOs. As such, the likelihood of Big 4 issuing MAO is not necessarily 
higher. Regarding the corporate governance controls, the marginal effects of Meet and Indep are 
significantly negative, suggesting that board meeting frequency and the percentage of independent 
directors are negatively associated with the incidence of MAO, consistent with the role of internal 
governance in ensuring financial reporting quality.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.3 Test of Hypothesis 2  
 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results based on the marginal effects of probit regressions 
specified in Equation (2), testing hypothesis H2. The marginal effects at the means are reported. 
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Throughout Panel A of this table, the marginal effects of the interaction term Fund×POE, which 
captures the impact of fund ownership of POEs in reducing the frequency of MAO, are significantly 
negative. For instance, in Regression II, when fund ownership is proxied by the open-end fund 
ownership ratio, this marginal effect is -0.338 (p-value = 0.035). The results support H2 and are also 
economically significant in that a one-standard-deviation increase in the OFOF (11.78%) leads to a 
4% decrease in the incidence of MAOs. Capturing the effect of fund ownership in SOEs, the marginal 
effect of Fund is not always significantly negative. We therefore argue that institutional investors, 
through mutual fund ownership, play a significant role in strengthening the financial reporting quality 
of POEs. This is because POEs are more dependent on the capital markets and more concerned about 
the views of external investors. In contrast, SOEs are under less pressure from monitoring by external 
investors because they enjoy preferential treatment from central and local government. Our results 
remain consistent under alternative measures of fund ownership such as the closed-end fund 
ownership and total ownership ratios.  
 
The findings regarding the effects of the control variables in Panel A of Table 5 are broadly 
similar to those in Table 4. The marginal effect of Size is negative and significant across the models, 
suggesting that larger firms are less likely to receive MAOs. The marginal effect of ST is positive and 
significant in all regressions, consistent with the expectation that firms experiencing consecutive 
losses have greater incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid being delisted, which results in the 
issuance of MAOs. The marginal effect of Analyst and OwnCon are negative and significant across 
the models, indicating that firms followed by more analysts and those with high ownership 
concentrations are less likely to receive MAOs. Finally, among the governance variables, the 
marginal effects of Meet and Indep are significantly negative, while the marginal effect of Bsize is 
significantly positive in all regressions, which implies that active, independent, and larger boards are 
more effective in constraining earnings management and therefore contribute to higher financial 
reporting quality. The findings are consistent with the view that independent directors have incentives 
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to be effective monitors so as to maintain their reputational capital (Fama and Jensen, 1983), and with 
the view that frequent boards meetings are a signal of increased vigilance and monitoring of 
managerial behavior, meaning that the interests of shareholders are well protected (Adams, 2003). 
 
In our analysis we use lagged explanatory variables to mitigate the endogeneity concern. In 
order to further address this concern, we present additional robustness tests based on an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach in Panel B of Table 5. Yuan et al. (2008) suggest a number of instruments in 
their study of the impact of fund ownership on firm performance, including the lagged proportion of 
tradable A-shares, the prior year’s stock turnover calculated as the ratio of trading volume to the total 
number of freely traded shares, the lagged indicator of Shanghai 180 or Shenzhen component indices, 
lagged firm leverage, the standard deviation of monthly stock returns, and a dummy variable for 
positive operating profits. Not all of them could be used as instruments in our setting because some 
are associated with the incidence of MAO. It is likely that operating performance and analyst 
following are correlated with the incidence of MAO in that firms experiencing consecutive negative 
profits tend to inflate their earnings to avoid being delisted by the stock exchange. Chen et al. (2012) 
find that financial analysts form a part of the external governance mechanism and play a monitoring 
role, helping to reduce the incidence of MAO. In addition, leverage and index inclusion may reflect 
the external monitoring from creditors and the stock exchange respectively, which may help to reduce 
the incidence of MAO. Therefore, our additional robustness test applies three instruments to estimate 
the predicted fund ownership (Predicted TFOF), namely the lagged ratio of freely traded shares to 
total shares, the standard deviation of monthly stock returns in the prior year, and the lagged stock 
turnover, which are unlikely to be correlated with MAO issuance. Panel B of Table 5 presents the 
results of this set of additional robustness tests. Notice that the marginal effect on Predicted TFOF is 
significantly negative for the full sample and for the sub-sample of POEs, but is not significant for the 
sub-sample of SOEs. This suggests that our results supporting hypotheses H1 and H2 are robust to the 
IV estimation used to control the endogeneity issue.  
18 
 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
4.4 Test of Hypothesis 3  
 
To test our hypothesis H3, we further partition the sample into high and low-growth companies 
based on the yearly median value of the price-to-book ratio and present the results of the marginal 
effects of the probit models in Table 6. The marginal effect of the interaction term of Fund×POE, 
which captures the impact of fund ownership on the incidence of MAO, is significantly negative 
throughout the table for the three measures of fund ownership only among the high-growth sample 
and not among the low-growth sample. For instance, under the open-end fund ownership measure, the 
marginal effect of Fund×POE is -0.358 (p-value=0.06) among the high-growth firms, implying that a 
one-standard-deviation increase in fund ownership leads to a 4.22% decrease in the incidence of 
MAO. This shows the economic significance of our results and supports our hypothesis H3 that 
mutual funds play a significant role in reducing the incidence of MAO, particularly among 
high-growth entrepreneurial firms. This is because high-growth firms have a greater need for 
additional investment capital, and face more pressure from monitoring by external investors, which in 
turn increases the effectiveness of this external governance mechanism on financial reporting quality. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
4.5 Robustness tests  
 
We perform further robustness tests to strengthen the rigor of our evidence. First of all, we 
construct alternative fund ownership measures by scaling each type of fund ownership by total shares 
(i.e., the sum of freely traded and restricted shares). Mutual funds normally invest only in freely 
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traded shares, for liquidity reasons, and therefore their influence on the board should depend on the 
proportion of unrestricted shares. Consistent with our main findings, Table 7 shows that the marginal 
effects of Fund×POE are significantly negative across the table, indicating mutual funds’ influence in 
reducing the number of MAOs issued to POEs. Next, we use an alternative specification of private 
ownership, namely the non-state ownership ratio (NSR), calculated as one minus the percentage of 
state ownership. As state ownership makes it easier for a firm to access corporate finance, we expect 
fund ownership to better ensure financial reporting quality among firms with less state ownership. 
The results reported in Table 8 show that the marginal effects of Fund×NSR are significantly negative 
across all regressions, which suggests that our findings are not sensitive to alternative measures of 
private control and thus reinforces our findings.  
 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 here] 
 
We also apply the Heckman two-step regression approach to address possible selection bias 
stemming from the fact that mutual fund managers may choose to invest in certain firms (e.g. those 
without MAOs). In the first step, we estimate a probit model with a binary fund ownership dummy as 
the dependent variable. The inverse Mills ratio generated is then included in the second-step 
regression to control for sample selection bias. The untabulated results are in line with the main 
findings. In addition, our results are robust to the following three estimations. First, we apply firm 
fixed effects and random effects by following Yuan et al. (2008). Second, we control for the potential 
effect of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) convergence in China from 2007 
onward, firstly by including a control variable POST2007, which equals one for observations after 
2007 and zero otherwise, and secondly by replicating the analysis excluding observations from 2008 
onward. Third, we add additional control variables from Firth et al. (2012) including lagged MAO, 
leverage, ROA, and the quick ratio. 
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Finally, Chen et al. (2007) suggest that, due to the high cost of selling a large stake, institutional 
investors holding higher stakes in a firm could exert a greater monitoring effect. Therefore, we 
incorporate a dummy variable FundTop10, which is set to 1 if a firm has at least one mutual fund 
among the 10 largest shareholders and 0 otherwise, to capture the impact of fund block holders. Our 
prediction is that mutual funds that are among the top 10 shareholders will have a greater effect in 
reducing the incidence of MAO, and that the effect should be more pronounced among POEs. Our 
predictions are supported by the results presented in Table 9. In the analysis of the full sample, the 
marginal effects of both FundTop10 and the interaction term FundTop10×POE are significantly 
negative based on the full sample and based on the sub-sample of firms with fund ownership. These 
findings further confirm our main findings by indicating that funds with a larger stake play a more 
significant monitoring role, especially among POEs.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
       One implication of our study is that state ownership and financial support of firms could impede 
the efficacy of external governance mechanisms. Prior studies show that government support and 
political connections are beneficial to Chinese firms, offering them competitive advantages and 
market benefits, which result in better firm performance (e.g., Nee, 1992; Peng and Luo, 2000; Tsang, 
1998; Davies et al., 1995). However, our findings indicate that there is also a negative side to 
government support of Chinese listed firms. We show that it reduces mutual funds’ external 
monitoring effect on financial reporting quality. As SOEs receive financial support from the 
government, they are less dependent on the capital markets and thus the monitoring role of external 
stakeholders is weaker. Overall, our results suggest that state ownership may lead to agency costs for 
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minority shareholders, which may impair the quality of financial reporting. 
 
Another implication of our study is that external governance mechanisms tend to be more 
effective for privately owned entrepreneurial firms. We show that better external governance through 
sources such as mutual funds could enhance financial reporting quality and in turn strengthen 
investors’ confidence and improve financial market liquidity. This is especially important for 
entrepreneurial firms with high growth since they are more dependent on external capital to fund their 
investment opportunities. Thus, our findings have important managerial and policy implications for 
the development of entrepreneurship finance and the capital market in China, as well as other 
emerging economies. 
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Table 1: Definitions of variables 
 
 
Variable Description 
MAO 
 
Equals 1 for firm-year observations with modified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise 
 
OFOF 
 
The ratio of open-end fund ownership to freely traded shares 
 
OFOT 
 
 
The ratio of open-end fund ownership to total shares (i.e. the sum of freely traded shares and 
restricted shares) 
 
CFOF 
 
The ratio of closed-end fund ownership to freely traded shares 
 
CFOT 
 
The ratio of closed-end fund ownership to total shares 
 
TFOF 
 
 
The ratio of total fund ownership (i.e. the sum of open- and closed-end fund ownership) to 
freely traded shares 
 
TFOT 
 
The ratio of total fund ownership to total shares 
 
POE 
 
Equals 1 for privately owned enterprises, and 0 otherwise 
 
Size 
 
Natural logarithm of market capitalization 
 
PB 
 
Price-to-book ratio 
 
ST 
 
 
Equals 1 for firms under Special Treatment (i.e. two consecutive years of losses), and 0 
otherwise 
 
Foreign 
 
The ratio of foreign shares to total shares  
 
Analyst 
 
The number of financial analysts following the firm 
 
OwnCon 
 
Herfindahl index of the 10 largest shareholders 
 
Big4 
 
Equals 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm, and 0 otherwise 
 
Duality 
 
Equals 1 if the CEO also holds the chair position, and 0 otherwise 
 
Meet 
 
The meeting frequency of the board 
 
Bsize 
 
The size of the board of directors  
 
Indep 
 
The number of independent directors relative to the total number of directors 
 
SBsize 
 
The size of the supervisory board 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
  
Full Sample   
  
MAO = 1 
  
MAO = 0 
    
   
  Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev Mean difference 
MAO 0.0938 0 0.2916 1 1 0 0 0 0 
  
OFOF 0.0572 0 0.1178 0.0066 0 0.0344 0.0625 0.0015 0.1221 -0.0559 *** 
OFOT 0.0259 0 0.0596 0.0034 0 0.0195 0.0282 0.0006 0.0619 -0.0248 *** 
CFOF 0.0159 0.0001 0.0418 0.0026 0 0.0167 0.0172 0.0003 0.0433 -0.0146 *** 
CFOT 0.0061 0 0.0161 0.0011 0 0.0071 0.0067 0.0002 0.0166 -0.0056 *** 
TFOF 0.0731 0.0014 0.1422 0.0092 0 0.0447 0.0797 0.0033 0.1471 -0.0705 *** 
TFOT 0.0321 0.0005 0.0685 0.0045 0 0.0237 0.0349 0.0012 0.071 -0.0304 *** 
POE 0.3336 0 0.4715 0.4883 0 0.5002 0.3176 0 0.4656 0.1707 *** 
Size 20.5571 20.4081 1.081 19.8654 19.7332 0.8925 20.6287 20.4706 1.0736 -0.7633 *** 
PB 3.4404 2.3401 3.9842 3.5914 2.0995 6.864 3.4247 2.3532 3.5558 0.1667 *** 
ST 0.0928 0 0.2902 0.4106 0 0.4923 0.0599 0 0.2374 0.3507 *** 
Foreign 0.07 0 0.2551 0.0699 0 0.2552 0.07 0 0.2551 -0.0001 
 
Analyst 2.8808 0 5.5943 0.4054 0 1.771 3.137 1 5.7889 -2.7316 *** 
OwnCon 0.1958 0.1614 0.1308 0.1512 0.1173 0.1141 0.2004 0.1675 0.1315 -0.0492 *** 
Big4 0.0677 0 0.2512 0.0324 0 0.1771 0.0713 0 0.2574 -0.0389 *** 
Duality 0.0101 0 0.0999 0.0117 0 0.1074 0.0099 0 0.0991 0.0018 *** 
Meet 0.5745 1 0.4944 0.5259 1 0.4997 0.5796 1 0.4937 -0.0537 *** 
Bsize 0.3718 0 0.4833 0.3769 0 0.4849 0.3712 0 0.4832 0.0057 ** 
Indep 0.8832 1 0.3211 0.8238 1 0.3812 0.8894 1 0.3137 -0.0656 *** 
SBsize 0.8882  1 0.3151 0.8744 1 0.3317 0.8897 1 0.3133 -0.0153 *** 
 Obs.    8,231      722      7,459       
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses. We separately report these for sub-samples of firm-year observations with and without MAO 
issuance. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 3: Correlation analysis 
 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in our analyses. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Bold text indicates significance at the 5% level.
Variables A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T 
A. MAO 1                                       
B. OFOF -0.14 1                                     
C. OFOT -0.12 0.91 1                                   
D. CFOF -0.10 0.47 0.35 1                                 
E. CFOT -0.10 0.49 0.46 0.92 1                               
F. TFOF -0.14 0.97 0.85 0.68 0.68 1                             
G. TFOT -0.13 0.91 0.98 0.52 0.63 0.90 1                           
H. POE 0.11 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 1                         
I. Size -0.21 0.53 0.51 0.26 0.28 0.51 0.51 -0.15 1                       
J. PB 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.22 1                     
K. ST 0.35 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.12 -0.15 -0.14 0.11 -0.23 0.17 1                   
L. Foreign 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.37 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.02 1                 
M. Analyst -0.14 0.63 0.59 0.25 0.28 0.59 0.59 -0.04 0.51 0.05 -0.15 0.05 1               
N. OwnCon -0.11 0.09 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 -0.27 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 0.10 1             
O. Big4 -0.05 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.06 -0.09 0.22 -0.02 -0.07 0.06 0.22 0.15 1           
P. Duality 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 1         
Q. Meet -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1       
R. Bsize 0.00 0.03 0.00     0.05 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.04 1     
S. Indep -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.17 1   
T. SBsize -0.01 0.00 0.01     0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.13 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 1 
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Table 4: Fund ownership and modified audit opinions (test of hypothesis H1) 
 
 
Open-end fund 
ownership  
Closed-end fund 
ownership  
Total mutual fund 
ownership  
Variables       
 
Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  
Fund -0.178 0.014  -0.303 0.027  -0.150 0.004  
POE 0.018 0.000  0.019 0.000  0.019 0.000  
Size -0.019 0.000  -0.020 0.000  -0.018 0.000  
PB -0.001 0.235  -0.001 0.227  -0.001 0.241  
ST 0.202 0.000  0.207 0.000  0.202 0.000  
Foreign 0.010 0.286  0.011 0.263  0.010 0.272  
Analyst -0.006 0.005  -0.007 0.000  -0.006 0.005  
OwnCon -0.120 0.000  -0.125 0.000  -0.120 0.000  
Big4 0.007 0.532  0.008 0.535  0.008 0.515  
Duality -0.0200 0.252  -0.021 0.244  -0.020 0.249  
Meet -0.009 0.043  -0.009 0.051  -0.009 0.049  
Bsize 0.009 0.078  0.009 0.072  0.009 0.077  
Indep -0.021 0.003  -0.021 0.003  -0.021 0.003  
SBsize 0.007 0.276  0.007 0.307  0.007 0.296  
          
Region fixed effect Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  
Industry fixed effect Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  
Pseudo R2 0.212   0.211   0.212    
Obs. 8,231    8,231    8,231    
          
 
This table presents the results of testing Hypothesis H1 based on the marginal effects of probit regression analysis of Equation 1. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
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Table 5: Fund ownership and modified audit opinion, conditional on whether the firm is a privately owned enterprise or not (test of hypothesis H2) 
 
Panel A: Mutual fund ownership ratio 
 
Open-end fund ownership  Closed-end fund ownership  Total mutual fund ownership  
Variables 
   
  
  Regression I  Regression II  Regression I  Regression II  Regression I  Regression II  
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
 Fund -0.337 0.001 
 
-0.083 0.227 
 
-0.59 0.010  -0.107 0.425  -0.264 0.000  -0.061 0.225 
 POE 0.042 0.000 
 
0.023 0.000 
 
0.04 0.000 
 
0.021 0.000  0.043 0.000  0.024 0.000 
 Fund×POE -0.523 0.039 
 
-0.338 0.035 
 
-1.110 0.061 
 
-0.548 0.091  -0.461 0.015  -0.284 0.015 
 Size -0.037 0.000 
 
-0.019 0.000 
 
-0.050 0.000 
 
-0.022 0.000  -0.037 0.000  -0.020 0.000 
 PB 0.002 0.006 
 
-0.001 0.229 
 
0.000 0.008 
 
-0.001 0.215  0.002 0.007  -0.001 0.238 
 ST      0.199 0.000 
    
0.196 0.000     0.191 0.000 
 Foreign      0.010 0.267 
    
0.010 0.282     0.010 0.268 
 Analyst      -0.006 0.005 
    
-0.01 0.000     -0.007 0.001 
 OwnCon      -0.119 0.000 
    
-0.115 0.000     -0.109 0.000 
 Big4      0.008 0.521 
    
0.010 0.397     0.010 0.384 
 Duality      -0.021 0.235 
    
-0.021 0.222     -0.021 0.217 
 Meet      -0.009 0.042 
    
-0.009 0.058     -0.0089 0.055 
 Bsize      0.008 0.082 
    
0.011 0.024     0.010 0.029 
 Indep      -0.021 0.002 
    
-0.024 0.001     -0.023 0.001 
 SBsize      0.007 0.288 
    
0.010 0.137     0.009 0.139 
 Region fixed effect No   
 
Yes  
 
No 
 
 Yes   No  
 
Yes 
 Industry fixed effect No   
 
Yes   
 
No 
 
 Yes   No  
 
Yes 
 Pseudo R2 0.111   
 
0.213   
 
0.102 
 
 0.210   0.113  
 
0.212 
 Obs. 8,231   
 
8,231   
 
8,231 
 
 8,231   8,231  
 
8,231 
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Panel B: Predicted mutual fund ownership ratio 
 
  Full sample  Listed POEs  Listed SOEs 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
POE 0.163 0.001  
  
 
  Predicted TFOF -1.985 0.035  -4.112 0.016  -1.588 0.183 
Size -0.178 0.000  -0.195 0.001  -0.167 0.002 
PB -0.003 0.593  -0.005 0.455  0.002 0.816 
ST 1.011 0.000  0.903 0.000  1.047 0.000 
Foreign 0.105 0.230  0.003 0.984  0.236 0.051 
Analyst -0.058 0.000  -0.110 0.001  -0.036 0.047 
OwnCon -1.048 0.000  -1.779 0.000  -0.813 0.001 
Big4 0.107 0.350  0.337 0.172  0.073 0.587 
Duality -0.293 0.182  -0.277 0.285  -0.462 0.314 
Meet -0.093 0.036  -0.143 0.046  -0.057 0.330 
Bsize 0.111 0.020  0.171 0.03  0.084 0.165 
Indep -0.186 0.004  -0.154 0.209  -0.209 0.006 
SBsize 0.102 0.149  0.093 0.365  0.094 0.365 
Region fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 8,128  2,686  5,442 
 
This table presents the results of testing Hypothesis H2. Panel A is based on the marginal effects of probit regression analysis of Equation 2. Panel B presents the marginal effects 
of probit model for predicted mutual fund ownership, based on instrumental variables including the proportion of freely traded shares in the prior year, the ratio of stock turnover 
to the total number of freely traded shares in the prior year, and the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns in the prior year. The sample size is reduced from 8,231 to 8,128 
due to missing values of these three variables. The predicted TFOF is generated from the instrumental regression in the first stage and then incorporated as a regressor in the 
second-stage regression. Note that the R2 is not reported when using the command “ivprobit” in STATA. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
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Table 6: Fund ownership and modified audit opinions among high and low-growth firms (test of hypothesis H3) 
 
 
Open-end fund ownership  Closed-end fund ownership  Total mutual fund ownership  
Variables 
   
  
 
 
High growth 
 
Low growth 
 
High growth 
 
Low growth  High growth  Low growth 
 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
 Fund -0.104  0.142  
 
-0.260  0.076  
 
-0.083  0.555   -0.518  0.080   -0.022  0.842   -0.497  0.070  
 POE 0.020  0.004  
 
0.016  0.041  
 
0.018  0.010  
 
0.014  0.085   0.020  0.006   0.016  0.038  
 FundPOE -0.358  0.060  
 
-0.128  0.596  
 
-0.768  0.087  
 
0.298  0.580   -0.559  0.049   -0.123  0.752  
 Size -0.014  0.002  
 
-0.016  0.008  
 
-0.022  0.000  
 
-0.015  0.002   -0.021  0.000   -0.014  0.004  
 PB 0.003  0.000  
 
-0.019  0.000  
 
0.003  0.000  
 
-0.018  0.000   0.003  0.000   -0.017  0.000  
 ST 0.059  0.000    0.200  0.000  
 
0.058  0.000  
 
0.208  0.000   0.059  0.000   0.199  0.000  
 Foreign -0.001  0.917    0.038  0.010  
 
0.000  0.972  
 
0.037  0.012   -0.002  0.884   0.036  0.013  
 Analyst -0.005  0.010    -0.004  0.243  
 
-0.008  0.000  
 
-0.008  0.048   -0.007  0.002   -0.006  0.101  
 OwnCon -0.108  0.000    -0.084  0.004  
 
-0.113  0.000  
 
-0.067  0.022   -0.116  0.000   -0.065  0.020  
 Big4 0.019  0.242    0.000  0.994  
 
0.024  0.149  
 
0.001  0.941   0.021  0.198   0.000  0.983  
 Duality -0.012  0.631    -0.024  0.315  
 
-0.013  0.611  
 
-0.023  0.373   -0.013  0.615   -0.023  0.316  
 Meet -0.010  0.091    -0.009  0.142  
 
-0.009  0.136  
 
-0.011  0.103   -0.010  0.114   -0.009  0.141  
 Bsize 0.011  0.076    0.006  0.385  
 
0.013  0.049  
 
0.011  0.109   0.012  0.056   0.009  0.165  
 Indep -0.019  0.039    -0.017  0.084  
 
-0.020  0.036  
 
-0.022  0.027   -0.021  0.029   -0.022  0.022  
 SBsize 0.013  0.103    0.000  0.965  
 
0.017  0.042  
 
0.003  0.782   0.017  0.036   0.003  0.797  
 Region fixed effect Yes   
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
 Yes   Yes  
 
Yes 
 Industry fixed effect Yes   
 
Yes   
 
Yes 
 
 Yes   Yes  
 
Yes 
 Pseudo R2 0.181   
 
0. 321   
 
0.176 
 
 0.309   0.175  
 
0.314 
 Obs. 4,159   
 
4,072   
 
4,159 
 
 4,072   4,159  
 
4,072 
 This table presents the results of testing Hypothesis H3 based on the marginal effects of the probit regression analysis of Equation 2 in the high and low-growth sub-samples 
separately. Firms are classified as high (low) growth if the market-to-book ratio is above (below) the yearly median value. Variable definitions are given in Table 1.
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Table 7: Total shares as the deflator for the calculation of fund ownership (robustness test) 
 
 
Open-end fund ownership  Closed-end fund ownership  Total mutual fund ownership  
Variables 
   
  
  Regression I  Regression II  Regression I  Regression II  Regression I  Regression II  
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
 Fund 0.044 0.000 
 
0.022 0.000 
 
0.042 0.000 
 
0.021 0.000  0.044 0.000  0.023 0.000 
 POE -0.536 0.020 
 
-0.029 0.831 
 
-1.256 0.021 
 
-0.109 0.743  -0.463 0.008  -0.040 0.719 
 FundPOE -0.995 0.057 
 
-0.594 0.062 
 
-2.527 0.073 
 
-1.328 0.080  -0.903 0.026  -0.531 0.032 
 Size -0.042 0.000 
 
-0.021 0.000 
 
-0.050 0.000 
 
-0.022 0.000  -0.041 0.000  -0.021 0.000 
 PB 0.002 0.006 
 
-0.001 0.226 
 
0.002 0.008 
 
-0.001 0.212  0.002 0.007  -0.001 0.222 
 ST 
   
0.196 0.000 
    
0.196 0.000     0.195 0.000 
 Foreign 
   
0.010 0.296 
    
0.010 0.294     0.010 0.294 
 Analyst 
   
-0.008 0.001 
    
-0.008 0.000     -0.007 0.001 
 OwnCon 
   
-0.115 0.000 
    
-0.117 0.000     -0.115 0.000 
 Big4 
   
0.009 0.447 
    
0.010 0.433     0.009 0.442 
 Duality 
   
-0.021 0.226 
    
-0.021 0.223     -0.021 0.220 
 Meet 
   
-0.009 0.044 
    
-0.009 0.054     -0.009 0.049 
 Bsize 
   
0.010 0.039 
    
0.0106 0.029     0.010 0.037 
 Indep 
   
-0.024 0.001 
    
-0.024 0.001     -0.024 0.001 
 SBsize 
   
0.010 0.112 
    
0.010 0.127     0.010 0.119 
 Region fixed effect 
 
No 
  
Yes 
  
No 
 
 Yes   No  
 
Yes 
 Industry fixed effect 
 
No 
  
Yes 
  
No 
 
 Yes   No  
 
Yes 
 Pseudo R2 
 
0.104 
  
0.210 
  
0.100 
 
 0.209   0.106  
 
0.210 
 Obs. 
 
8,231  
 
8,231  
 
8,231 
 
 8,231   8,231  
 
8,231 
 This table reports the results of robustness tests using total shares as the deflator for the calculation of fund ownership. The results are based on the marginal effects of probit model 
of the incidence of modified audit opinions (MAOs). Variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
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Table 8: Alternative specification of private ownership (robustness test) 
 
  
Open-end fund 
ownership 
  
Closed-end fund 
ownership 
  
Total mutual fund 
ownership 
  
Variables   
 
  
 
  
 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Coeff. p-value 
 
Fund 0.128 0.251 
 
0.316 0.297  -0.040 0.719  
NSR   0.049 0 
 
0.045 0  0.023 0  
Fund×NSR -0.434 0.02 
 
-0.877 0.059  -0.531 0.032  
Size -0.020 0 
 
-0.023 0  -0.021 0  
PB -0.001 0.26 
 
-0.001 0.29  -0.001 0.222  
ST 0.201 0 
 
0.196 0  0.194 0  
Foreign 0.009 0.346 
 
0.010 0.303  0.010 0.294  
Analyst -0.006 0.005 
 
-0.008 0  -0.007 0.001  
OwnCon -0.093 0 
 
-0.091 0  -0.115 0  
Big4 0.007 0.576 
 
0.010 0.389  0.009 0.442  
Duality -0.019 0.276 
 
-0.019 0.295  -0.021 0.22  
Meet -0.010 0.031 
 
-0.010 0.037  -0.009 0.049  
Bsize 0.009 0.075 
 
0.012 0.016  0.010 0.037  
Indep -0.021 0.002 
 
-0.024 0.001  -0.024 0.001  
SBsize 0.007 0.285 
 
0.010 0.121  0.010 0.119  
Region fixed effect Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  
Industry fixed effect Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
  
Pseudo R
2
 0.213 
  
0.211 
  
0.21 
 
  
Obs. 8,231     8,231     8,231     
 
This table reports the results of the robustness test using an alternative specification of private ownership. The results are based on the marginal effects of probit model of the 
incidence of modified audit opinions (MAOs). NSR denotes the proportion of non-state shares, measured as one minus the percentage of state ownership. Other variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
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Table 9: Fund stake and financial reporting quality (robustness test) 
 
   Full Sample   TFOF>0 
 
Coeff p-value 
 
Coeff p-value 
FundTop10 -0.021 0.005  -0.017 0.007 
POE 0.026 0  0.028 0 
FundTop10×POE -0.027 0.006  -0.024 0.001 
Size -0.016 0  -0.007 0.052 
PB -0.001 0.173  0.002 0.039 
ST 0.199 0  0.074 0.001 
Foreign 0.012 0.202  0.002 0.842 
Analyst -0.006 0.002  -0.004 0.005 
OwnCon -0.117 0  -0.036 0.045 
Big4 0.007 0.561  -0.015 0.099 
Duality -0.022 0.227  -0.011 0.521 
Meet -0.009 0.05  -0.008 0.057 
Bsize 0.009 0.089  -0.002 0.582 
Indep -0.022 0.003  -0.017 0.021 
SBsize 0.006 0.366  0.005 0.476 
Region fixed effect Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Industry fixed effect Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2158   0.1466  
Obs. 8231     5858   
 
This table reports the results of the robustness test looking at the effect of the fund stake. The results are based on the 
marginal effects of probit model of the incidence of modified audit opinions (MAOs). FundTop10 is set to one if one or 
more mutual funds were among the 10 largest shareholders of a listed firm in the prior year, and zero otherwise. Variable 
definitions are given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
